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Against Molinism: 
A Refutation of William Lane Craig’s 
Molinism 
Daniel T. Clemons 
 
The Problem We Face 
Why is there pain? This has been one of the major problems to occupy 
Christians. In fact, this problem has haunted both Christians and Jews as far back 
as the oldest books of the Hebrew canon. One attempt to resolve the problem has 
been to postulate that there is some good that may outweigh the evil in the world. 
Perhaps it is to God’s glory that evil exists. After all, without evil how could great 
goods such as sacrificial love, grace, and mercy, exist? 
A common candidate for such a “greater good” has been human freedom. 
However, not just any freedom will do. The sort of freedom called for is 
libertarian freedom. The kind of freedom that knows no sovereign save the person 
to whom it belongs. Traditionally, Christians have thought of God as the being 
who created the world “in the beginning” from nothing. Likewise, libertarian 
Christians assert that man, in the act of choosing and exercising his will, has an 
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analogous creative ability as a byproduct of being made in the image of God. 
Many Christians think of this as a great good that could be used to outweigh the 
problem of evil. However, some Christians have questioned whether God could 
truly be said to be in control of the world, or sovereign in providence, if man’s 
freedom to choose limits God’s control. 
Is it possible to simultaneously assert God’s sovereign providence over every 
detail in creation and man’s freedom, in the libertarian sense, without a 
contradiction? The Jesuit theologian, Luis de Molina, thought it was possible. 
Several contemporary Molinist philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga, William 
Lane Craig, and Thomas P. Flint argue on similar lines. Molinism (named after 
Molina) is a theory which poses a plausible scenario to reconcile divine 
omniscience and providence with free creaturely choices. In this paper, the 
argument will be made that Molinism, specifically Craig’s take on Molinism, is 
unnecessary and fails as a reconciliatory theory. First, Molinism is an unnecessary 
theory because libertarian freedom, one of Molinism’s starting presuppositions, is 
an incoherent concept. Second, Molinism fails as a reconciliatory theory because 
libertarian freedom is logically incompatible with the Molinist system itself. 
Defining the Terms 
Before jumping into the argument of this paper, we will need good working 
definitions of the relevant terms. First, with respect to providence, in a radio 
broadcasted debate with Paul Helm, William Lane Craig made the following 
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assertion: 
The Molinist has this very, very strong sense of divine sovereignty and 
meticulous providence…. If [Luis Molina] were living today I [Craig] 
think he would say that the tiniest motion of a sub-atomic particle cannot 
occur but without God’s direct will or permission. So, this is a very strong 
view of divine sovereignty and control.1 (Emphasis mine) 
Craig seems to assert, both here and elsewhere, that his definition of providence is 
very similar to the Augustinian, Thomist, and Reformed understandings of 
providence.2 So now we will examine how this Reformed tradition defines divine 
providence. In What About Free Will? the reformed thinker Scott Christensen 
defines divine sovereignty in providence as “The biblical doctrine that God 
controls time, space, and history. Calvinists usually hold that God meticulously 
determines all events that transpire, including human choices.”3 Also, Molinist 
philosopher Thomas Flint writes: 
Many of the more ardent defenders of providence, from Reformed 
thinkers such as Calvin, Leibniz, and Jonathan Edwards to Thomists such 
as Domingo Banez and Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, clearly belong in 
[the Compatibilist traditionalist] camp, while many others, including such 
giants as Augustine and Aquinas, might also (though more 
controversially) be situated [in the same camp]. Compatibilist 
traditionalists insist that God, as first cause, is the ultimate causal 
determiner of all that takes place. As compatibilists, such theists insist that 
the efficacy of divine decrees is not inconsistent with genuine human 
                                                          
 1 Justin Brierley, “Calvinism vs Molinism,” Premier Christian Radio – Unbelievable?, 
recorded January 4, 2014, 
<https://www.premierchristianradio.com/shows/Saturday/Unbelievable/episodes/calvinism-vs-
Molinism-william-lane-craig-paul-helm-unbelievable>. 
 
2 For sake of brevity, this Compatibilist tradition will be simply labeled ‘Reformed.’ 
 
3 Scott Christensen, What About Free Will?, (P&R Publishing: Phillipsburg, NJ, 2016), 9. 
Emphasis mine. 
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freedom, for God determines not only the occurrence of events but also 
their mode (free or unfree). Many Thomists, for example, have argued that 
our actions would indeed be unfree were they the deterministic causal 
consequences of prior events, that is, were the type of physical 
determinism championed by most contemporary compatibilists true. Yet 
God, they insist, can still determine free actions, because no action can 
occur without God's concurrent activity. Hence, as the human agent acts 
freely, God simultaneously determines its act, thereby safeguarding both 
human freedom and divine control.4  
Note the insinuation that Thomistic dual-agency is inherently compatibilistic if 
God is described as the ultimate cause. 
Now to define Libertarian freedom. It seems the great majority of 
philosophers consider free will a necessary condition for moral praiseworthiness 
and blameworthiness and a theory of freedom that does not account for moral 
responsibility can arguably be described as inadequate. Libertarianism is a free 
will theory that is supposed to provide a robust sense of moral responsibility for 
the free person. Craig himself subscribes to a particular form of libertarian 
freedom known as agent-causal libertarianism.5 According to Randolph Clarke 
and Justin Capes, under agent-causal libertarianism, 
[a]n agent, it is said, is a persisting substance; causation by an agent is 
causation by such a substance. Since a substance is not the kind of thing 
                                                          
4 Thomas P. Flint, "Providence," in Blackwell Companions to Philosophy: A Companion 
to Philosophy of Religion 2nd ed., ed. Charles Taliaferro, Paul Draper, and Philip L. Quinn. 
(Blackwell Publishers, 2010). Para 13. 
http://ezproxy.liberty.edu/login?url=https://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/bkcphilrel/pr
ovidence/0?institutionId=5072. Emphasis original. 
 
5 Craig affirms the agent-causal view in a Q&A session with Kevin Harris. See William 
Lane Craig, “Questions on Molinism, Compatibilism, and Free Will,” Reasonable Faith Podcast, 
recorded July 27, 2011, <https://www.reasonablefaith.org/media/reasonable-faith-
podcast/questions-on-molinism-compatibilism-and-free-will/>. 
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that can itself be an effect (though various events involving it can be), on 
these accounts an agent is in a strict and literal sense an originator of her 
free decisions, an uncaused cause of them.6 
Note the term “persisting.” I think what is meant here is that this substance has the 
power of being in and of itself. Also, note that, according to Clarke and Capes, 
being an originator and cause necessitates having this power of being and being 
able to impart such being into the choices. J. P. Moreland seems to agree with this 
understanding of libertarian freedom as he lists four “basic ideas contained in a 
theory of libertarian agency.”7 The first two of these are as follows: “P is a 
substance that has the active power to bring about e,” and “P exerted power as a 
first mover (an "originator") to bring about e.”8 Here, P represents a person with 
libertarian free will and e represents a free action. Likewise, Eleonore Stump in 
her essay, “Augustine on Free Will,” described the second of her conditions for 
modified libertarianism in this way: “an agent acts with free will, or is morally 
responsible for an act, only if her own intellect and will are the sole ultimate 
source or first cause of her act.”9 
                                                          
6 Randolph Clarke and Justin Capes, “Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of 
Free Will,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Spring 2017 Edition), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/incompatibilism-theories/. 
 
7 J.P. Moreland, “Naturalism and Libertarian Agency,” Philosophy & Theology 10, no. 2 
(1997), 353-383. 
 
8 Ibid. 
 
9 It is important to note that in footnote seven on page 143 Stump states the following: 
“Furthermore, there is a complication which I am leaving to one side here. Insofar as God is the 
creator of every created thing and insofar as any created cause is always dependent on the 
operation of divine causality, no created thing can ever be the sole cause of anything or the 
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God is an agent, the uncaused first cause, and it is in this fact that His 
sovereign freedom consists. In agent-causal libertarianism so is every human 
being. Human freedom, per this definition, is arguably univocal with divine 
freedom. 
It is important to note that libertarians are not saying that free humans have 
the ability to create on the grand scope to which God can. Certainly, our free 
actions do not include things like actualizing universes. I am merely noting that 
my free act to take a sip of the coffee that I wish were next to me is one that is 
made ex nihilo in the same way that God creates. The difference between the two 
instances seems to be one of amount or scope of the ability, not so much a 
difference of the type of freedom. 
The last thing to be defined is Molinism itself. Luis Molina was a Jesuit and 
counter reformer.10 The purpose of Molinism was to soften the blow of the 
reformers’ strong doctrine of sovereign providence by reconciling God’s 
sovereignty with a Pelagian or Semi-Pelagian understanding of freedom. 
Consider the moments (logically) prior to creation. Traditionally, there are 
                                                          
ultimate first cause of anything. What is at issue for Augustine on free will and grace, however, is 
whether God is also the cause of the will in some stronger sense than this.” Eleonore Stump, 
“Augustine on Free Will,” in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine. eds. Eleonore Stump and 
Norman Kretzmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Publishers, 2001.), 125.  
 
10 William L. Craig, “God Directs All Things,” in Four Views on Divine Providence, ed. 
Dennis W. Jowers. (Zondervan: Grand Rapids, MI, 2011), 81. 
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two moments prior to creation.11 The first moment is God’s knowledge of all 
logical possibilities or, in other words, possible worlds.12 God’s knowledge of 
these truths is traditionally said to be located in God’s nature.13 In a sense, this 
moment represents God as being self-aware. Thus, this moment is often called 
God’s natural knowledge. From among these logical possibilities, God freely 
actualizes a world of His choosing. 
God’s knowledge that is contingent upon this process of actualization is called 
God’s free knowledge. In order, the moments may appear like something akin to 
the following: God has a nature. God has knowledge of His own nature including 
all possible worlds He can actualize (natural knowledge). God freely decrees the 
actualization of a world according to the possibilities of His own nature. God has 
knowledge of His own decree (free knowledge). 
The disagreement that Molinism has with the above traditional understanding 
of God’s knowledge is that God strongly actualizes all things, meaning He 
directly or mediately causes all things to come about.14 If this is so, the Molinist 
reasons, then God is the author of evil. The remedy the Molinist attempts to 
                                                          
11 Daniel L. Akin ed., A Theology for the Church (B&H Publishing: Nashville, TN, 
2014), 568. 
 
12 William Lane Craig, Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (E. J. Brill: Leiden, 
The Netherlands, 1991), 237. 
 
13 Ibid. 
 
14 This is contrasted with the Molinist position that God weakly actualizes all things 
through free creatures acting in freedom permitting circumstances. 
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provide, then, is a third moment before creation. This third moment of divine 
knowledge occurs logically posterior to the natural knowledge and logically prior 
to the free knowledge. Hence, the name Middle Knowledge.15 
Where natural knowledge is all that is logically possible and free Knowledge 
is all that God actualizes, middle knowledge is God’s knowledge of all that 
libertarian free humans would freely do given certain freedom permitting 
circumstances. It is essentially God’s knowledge of true statements in the form “if 
this freedom permitting circumstance were the case for this person, then this 
person would act freely in this way.” These are commonly called counterfactuals. 
In the Molinist system, God bases His free choice to actualize the world on not 
only His natural knowledge but also His middle knowledge of what any free 
creature would do if he or she were actualized in a particular freedom-permitting 
circumstance. In other words, natural knowledge limits the worlds God can 
actualize to those that are logically possible, then middle knowledge limits the 
logically possible worlds that God can actualize to those that correspond to the 
true counterfactuals. (i.e. it is certainly logically possible that I refrain from taking 
a sip of my coffee, however that particular counterfactual is not a true one and 
thus any possible worlds in which that counterfactual is true are infeasible for 
God to actualize.) Thus, God’s options to actualize are limited to the possible 
                                                          
15 William Lane Craig, Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom, 237. 
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worlds that correspond to the true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.16 
The Unnecessary Theory 
If Molinism is to be a working reconciliatory theory, two things are necessary. 
First, there needs to be a paradox to be reconciled, namely the truth of both 
libertarian freedom and the sovereign providence of God in all things. If one of 
these two things to be reconciled were not the case, then there would be no need 
for Molinism. The second would be the successful reconciliation of the paradox. 
In this section, the first of the two necessary conditions will be addressed. 
The two assertions to be assumed in Molinism as it pertains to divine 
sovereignty are libertarian freedom and the strong Reformed understanding of 
divine providence. This section will present arguments to the effect that rational 
libertarian freedom is not the case and, therefore, Molinism is unnecessary 
because rational behavior is a necessary condition for moral praise and blame.17 
Suppose a person (call him John) is at the grocery store and chooses to buy 
steak for dinner. Now for a person to be rational or reasonable in choosing, it 
seems evident that he must be able to sift through the various options when 
choosing and pick his choice according to good reasons. However, willfully 
                                                          
16 William L. Craig, “God Directs All Things,” 82-3. 
 
17 Rational action seems to be a necessary condition for moral praise and blame. When 
coming to a verdict concerning a crime this seems very evident. We often find less fault with those 
experiencing mental illnesses than with those who rationally act criminally and even lessen 
sentences based on claims of temporary insanity. 
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arriving at good reasons for the choice made, though necessary, is not a sufficient 
condition for rationality. It seems that a person must make choices according to 
what appear to be the best available reasons consistently to be considered a 
rational person.18 This self-determination may be described as a natural ability, 
but not a rational ability to sift through the options freely.19 
Why did John choose to buy the steak instead of choosing not to? Here it is 
important to distinguish between the subjective reasons for buying the steak, and 
the objective reasons for why John bought the steak.20 This distinction is a 
variation of C. S. Lewis’ ‘looking at versus looking along’ distinction in 
“Meditations in a Toolshed.”21 The subjective reasons will be examined first. 
Either John had reasons, or he had no reasons for choosing to buy the steak. If he 
had no reasons, then John has acted merely willfully, not rationally. Suppose John 
did have reasons. Assuming that John is rational, were the reasons sufficient to 
                                                          
18 Notice, it seems that this description has experience to commend it. When we see a 
person acting unreasonably arbitrarily consistently, we typically describe them as insane, though 
they seem to retain the ability to sift through the options and make volitional choices.  
 
19 This distinction between natural ability and rational ability to sift through options, is a 
reapplication of Jonathan Edwards’ distinction between natural ability to do otherwise and moral 
ability to do otherwise. See Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, ed. Paul Ramsey (Yale: 
United States, 2009), 159-60. 
 
20 Here, by “subjective” I mean to refer to personal motivations. The water is boiling 
because I want to make a pot of coffee. By objective I mean the mechanical distinct from personal 
motivation. The water is boiling because the electrical energy is converted into heat in the stove-
coil which heats the pot containing the water that releases impurities at certain temperatures. 
These could be referred to as the why and how a choice is made. 
 
21 C. S. Lewis, “Meditations in a Toolshed,” in God in the Dock, (Eerdmans, Grand 
Rapids, MI: 1970), 212-5. 
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move him to buy the steak? If so, then determinism seems to be the case. If not, 
then how are the reasons relevant to his choice? 
Suppose that somehow his subjective reasons, although not causal, are still 
relevant to his choice. Perhaps one could say they inclined him without causing 
him to choose a certain way. But what does the term incline indicate? It indicates 
that the person is inclined to choose. Such a situation could no longer be 
descriptive of an unmoved mover. Hence, we could not be referring to an agent 
here. 
Perhaps one may say that John’s reasons are not causal but still relevant 
because the reasons are necessary for making the choice and not sufficient. Is 
there a sufficient reason for why John chose to buy the steak? Here the objective 
reasons are explored. What if John as an agent is sufficient to explain why he 
bought the steak? This sounds a great deal like Leibniz’s “complete individual 
concept,” which is highly necessitarian.22 What if there were no subjective reason 
to buy the steak, and John as an agent is simply sufficient for a choice to be 
made? If John were to just choose on the spot without any greater inclination of 
                                                          
22 Leibniz’ “complete individual concept” is the theory that all complete individuals, such 
as Alexander the Great or the coffee mug sitting to my right, are defined by all of their properties 
including all relational properties. My mug in order to be my mug is sitting on a particular table, 
made with a particular type of wood, which was gathered from a particular forest, which supports 
a particular ecosystem at a particular time etc. In sum, all truths of the universe could theoretically 
be entailed by my coffee mug. If one of these facts were different, this mug would be a different 
mug. But if this were a different mug than this universe would not be the same universe. If it were 
the same universe with a different mug, then a contradiction results. Brandon C. Look, "Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Summer 2017 
Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/leibniz/>. 
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reasons, then it seems he has forfeited his rationality in that instance. Why? As I 
argued above, choosing according to what appear to be the best reasons is 
necessary for being a rational or reasonable person. Some have objected that they 
have experienced a moment of indifference and have still chosen.23 I must 
confess, I am not sure I know what they mean. When given the choice between 
two options and unsure of what to pick, I do not choose. On the contrary, I freeze, 
often comically, in uncertainty and refer to the advice of others. I know of no 
situation where I had absolutely no greater reason for my choice, no matter how 
trivial or obvious the reason. 
In conclusion, it seems that agent-causal libertarianism cannot answer the 
question of why a particular choice is made. Libertarian freedom seems to offer 
no rational explanation for why a particular choice is made. Thus, it does not 
seem likely that we can praise or blame the person who acts with libertarian 
freedom. Therefore, on the above argument Libertarianism is inadequate as a free 
will theory and, thus, the paradox necessary for Molinism is not the case. 
The Impossible Picture 
Assuming that there is a real paradox present, the second step to a working 
theory of Molinism is the process of reconciliation itself. In this section, the goal 
                                                          
23 A pertinent question on this objection: assuming I do experience such a libertarian 
moment, what reason do I have for thinking the kind of freedom I only seem to experience when 
choosing what to eat or which household appliance to purchase is the necessary condition for 
being morally culpable? 
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will be to show that Craig’s Molinism does not succeed in its attempted 
reconciliation by giving two ways in which Craig’s Molinism cannot reconcile 
human autonomy and God’s sovereign providence. 
First, in “God Directs All Things: On Behalf of a Molinist View of 
Providence,” Craig says in a footnote: 
In a Molinist scheme, God does not have middle knowledge of how he 
himself would freely choose to act in any set of circumstances. For that 
would obliterate God’s freedom, since the truth of such so-called 
counterfactuals of divine freedom would be prior to and, hence, 
independent of God’s decree.24 
Furthermore, in Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom, Craig notes that 
“Molina believed that [middle knowledge concerning decisions of his own will] 
would rob God of his freedom, presumably because which counterfactuals are 
true or false does not depend on God’s will.”25 
So, what would nullify God’s freedom are counterfactuals that are true 
independent of His free actions. One way for counterfactuals to be independent of 
free actions is for the counterfactuals to be logically prior to the free actions. But 
God’s middle knowledge includes counterfactuals which are logically prior to 
and, by Craig’s reasoning, independent of the actual world, including all free 
creaturely acts. Therefore, all ‘free’ creatures cannot be free. Therefore, Molinism 
fails as a reconciliatory theory. 
                                                          
24 William L. Craig, “God Directs All Things,” 82. 
 
25 William Lane Craig, Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom, 238. 
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Suppose the Molinist objects to the movement from the divine will to the 
creaturely will. After all, there is a great difference between God and man. In 
response, the free will is precisely the best topic for such a comparison to take 
place. Per the definition given by Clarke and Capes above, agent-causal 
libertarianism ascribes the power of being an un-moved mover and creating one’s 
choice ex nihilo. This seems univocal to the divine free will. Recall that Flint 
seems to insinuate dual-agency would not be an exception to this. If this similarity 
between God and men holds, which seems likely, then creaturely freedom would 
not be possible within the Molinist framework. 
Second, consider God’s middle knowledge of persons prior to actualization. 
Craig has suggested that God can know infallibly what any person P will do, just 
like Craig could know his wife’s preferred choice of food in a given situation.26 
Going back to an earlier example, the thing to see is that there is truth to be 
known about John (our steak shopper) logically prior to his existence. This truth is 
exhaustive of John’s entire life and all John could possibly be. The actual John is 
defined by the pre-actual John and, therefore, the only variation in what John does 
or can do is contingent in the circumstance C presented to John. The objection is 
that pre-actual John is closely akin to Leibniz’ “complete individual concept” 
                                                          
26 William Lane Craig, “Does God Really Know What I’ll Do in the Future?”, 
Reasonable Faith Podcast, recorded on April 30, 2016, 
<https://www.reasonablefaith.org/media/reasonable-faith-podcast/does-god-really-know-what-ill-
do-in-the-future/>. 
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described above with the exception that this notion is a hypothetical 
circumstantial concept of John as opposed to a set-in-stone concept. 
This objection does not rest on causation, for it is not necessary that the 
concept of John cause John’s actions. The point is that John’s willing as he does is 
necessarily the case in any given circumstance. There seems to be a strong 
necessitarianism present in counterfactual statements. 
Conclusion 
I have argued that one of Craig’s goals is to reconcile libertarian freedom with 
a strong sense of divine providence via Molinism, and that the necessary 
conditions for the attainment of this goal are that, first, the above paradox 
concerning libertarian freedom and a strong sense of divine providence be the 
case, and second, that the paradox be successfully reconciled.  
With the above two necessary conditions in mind, this paper first argued 
against the adequacy of libertarianism. I attempted to show that either the agent 
acting with libertarian freedom would be acting irrationally, or that the concept of 
an agent willing without any particular reason for doing so would be inexplicable 
and therefore incoherent. Thus, the Libertarian theory of freedom seems 
inadequate. Second, I argued that libertarian freedom as such would not logically 
cohere with Craig’s Molinism. If either of these independent lines of 
argumentation is successful, then Craig’s Molinism is refuted. 
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